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Could the Spanish Republic Have Defeated Nationalist 
Rebels if not for Outside Interference? 
A Botched Coup d’état  
Yes, the Republicans could have won the civil war save for foreign intervention. Nobody 
planned a civil war. The 33 months of bitterly fought struggle were the result of a failed coup 
d’état. After losing the general elections in February 1936, the national bloc – formed by 
fascists, monarchists, conservatives and Catholics – abandoned the constitutional road to 
power (via the ballot box) and sought to destroy a left-wing and progressive Republic through 
violence. The following month, leading africanistas (colonial officers) gathered in Madrid to 
hatch the rebellion at the house of a parliamentary candidate for the dominant Catholic party 
(CEDA). They never anticipated a protracted confrontation. On the contrary, they assumed 
that their uprising would meet with prompt success. After all, Spain had a long record of 
praetorian take-overs, the last being staged by General Miguel Primo de Rivera in September 
1923 which led to a military dictatorship until January 1930. They counted on the advantage 
of a surprise strike so as to eliminate those senior officers reluctant to break their oath of 
loyalty to the government. They could also rely on the mobilization of thousands of civilians, 
members of the different right-wing parties. 
After the military rebellion began in the Moroccan Protectorate in the evening of 17th July 
1936, it spread to mainland Spain during the following days. Although General Francisco 
Franco’s propaganda suggested that divine providence guided the fulfilment of his holy 
crusade, there are sound foundations to speculate that without foreign intervention, the 
rebellion would have petered out. 
After a week of bloody clashes, the military sedition had largely failed. With the exception of 
a few cities in the south and Oviedo (Asturias), the Canary Islands and the Balearics (with the 
exception of Menorca), the rebels or nationalists controlled only the traditionally conservative 
areas of Galicia, Old Castilla and Navarra, where the insurrection was greeted with 
enthusiasm. In contrast, a combination of the swift response of the unions and the loyalty of 
the greater part of the state police, security forces and senior army officers meant that nearly 
two thirds of the country remained in the hands of the Republic. This territory included the 
main capitals (Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia and Bilbao), the industrial northern and eastern 
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areas, the entire Mediterranean coast as far south as Málaga and the vast southern rural 
regions (Extremadura, Murcia, New Castilla and Andalucía). Furthermore, Spain’s Air Force 
(albeit tiny) and the country’s huge gold reserves (the fourth largest in the world) remained in 
the hands of the government. The Army of Africa, containing the fierce Foreign Legion and 
the Regulares (indigenous Moorish troops commanded by Spanish officers), Spain’s most 
battle-hardened professional military force, led by General Francisco Franco, was paralysed 
by the problem of transport across the Straits of Gibraltar after sailors stayed loyal to the 
Republic, overpowered their officers and retained control of the fleet. Based on that 
correlation of demographic and economic resources, it seems reasonable to argue that the 
rebellion had its days numbered. 
The Great Powers’ Fateful Intervention 
Lacking significant modern weaponry and any important arms industry, both sides rapidly 
looked abroad to obtain vital military supplies. Consequently, as Hispanist Paul Preston 
suggested, the response of the European Great Powers essentially determined the course and 
outcome of the war.1 
The first hints of foreign reaction favoured the Republic, after all the legally established 
government of Spain, a member of the League of Nations and most international forums. 
Both Italy, exhausted after its weary Abyssinian experience, and Germany, whose 
expansionist plans lay in central Europe and who had no significant interest in Spain, turned 
down the Nationalists’ initial pleas for aid. At the same time, neighbouring France, ruled by a 
similar left-wing coalition (Front Populaire) under the socialist Léon Blum, appeared ready 
to help its Spanish counterparts and deliver weapons. However, the seemingly logical 
international context soon changed dramatically. 
On 25 July, the French government reversed its initial stance. Crucial sectors of the economic 
and diplomatic establishment, the armed forces and the Catholic Church, sympathized with the 
Spanish rebels. Faced domestically with similar political polarization as Spain, there were fears 
that direct involvement in that conflict could induce ‘patriotic France’ to emulate its Spanish 
counterparts. Simultaneously, the Blum cabinet was under huge pressure from Britain, France’s 
vital ally, to avoid arming the Republic, including warnings that if French activities triggered a 
war in Europe, she would find herself alone. Class, upbringing, and vast financial interests in 
Spain led the British ruling elites to loath the left-wing Republic. Moreover, both Stanley 
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Baldwin’s existing administration and, from May 1937, that of Neville Chamberlain, were 
committed appeasing the fascist dictatorships. Tragically for the Republic, both Adolf Hitler and 
Benito Mussolini also undertook a radical about-face. On 25 July, a Spanish mission met the 
German dictator in his holiday retreat at Bayreuth where Hitler took the fateful decision to 
provide military aid. Two days later, the Duce also committed himself to the Spanish adventure. 
They both believed that the reward for what they first assumed would be a secretive and small-
scale operation (a few but crucial transport planes, ammunition, pilots and advisers) could be 
huge: a vital ally in a strategically key area. 
 Fascist aid together with French paralysis altered dramatically what otherwise would 
have merely been the repression of ill-armed and isolated pockets of resistance. From early 
August 1936, German and Italian aircraft performed the first major airlift in history 
transforming a botched coup into the inexorable and bloody advance northwards of the Army 
of Africa’s crack troops. In October, as they reached the gates of Madrid, the Republic 
seemed in the verge of defeat. However, the crucial impact of foreign intervention was 
revealed again as the timely intervention of the Soviet Union resulted in prolonging the 
conflict. 
 On 14 September, baffled by the passivity of the western democracies, the Kremlin 
abandoned its initial cautious approach, which was limited to displays of platonic support. It 
could not countenance the emergence of another right-wing dictatorship in Europe that, 
moreover, would seal the encirclement of its potential ally, France. Furthermore, Moscow 
regarded the successful defence of a Popular Front administration (the embodiment of the 
alliance between liberal bourgeois and communist parties) as the bridgehead towards a future 
understanding with the Allies founded on the common fear of Nazi expansionism. 
Simultaneously, the Communist International took advantage of the resounding international 
appeal of a besieged Republic, resisting a military insurrection backed by Italy and Germany, 
to organize the recruitment of volunteers to fight in Spain: the International Brigades. 
Communist parties were instructed to organise the enrolment and transport of individuals. 
Their success, attracting volunteers from 54 countries from around the world, was unique in 
modern European warfare. Apart from a small number of adventurers, most of them travelled 
to Spain to fight for what they considered the last ditch stand against the apparently 
invincible march of reaction in Europe. 
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 The first deliveries of Soviet weapons and the psychological boost provided by the 
formation of the first International Brigades proved decisive. In November 1936, against all 
expectations, General Franco’s troops were held at the gates of Madrid. Short of manpower and 
now facing a better-equipped enemy, Nationalist hopes for a swift capture of the capital and the 
conclusion of the war vanished. In fact, the stalemate in Madrid was a very serious blow for 
them. With their elite troops bogged down and badly crippled by casualties, the insurgents even 
contemplated defeat. 
The Japanese Wife 
The potentially fatal setback for the Nationalists in Madrid was gradually undone by the 
internationalization of the conflict. As the significant increase in foreign armament and 
manpower flowing into Spain transformed hitherto relatively small-scale armed clashes into 
major battles, the flawed implementation of a Non-Intervention Agreement sealed the 
Republic’s tragic fate. 
Despite ideological and strategic reasons and even glaring evidence of Italian assistance to the 
Nationalists, the French Popular Front’s only response in August 1936 was an appeal to the other 
European powers to subscribe to a Non-Intervention Agreement (NIA) in Spain. This policy was 
regarded by the French government as the best available solution to withstand massive internal 
and external pressures, and keep the administration afloat. As André Blumel, Blum’s chef de 
cabinet, noted: ‘Non-Intervention was essentially an attempt to prevent others from doing what 
France was incapable of accomplishing’.2 At that stage, the French prime minister believed that 
an effective arms embargo would help the Spanish government.3 In fact, it embodied France’s 
retreat before British pressure and revealed in full its weakness. 
Twenty-seven European nations agreed to abide by the NIA. 4  In September, a working 
committee to supervise its implementation (Non-Intervention Committee, NIC) was 
established in London with the respective ambassadors in Britain acting as representatives of 
their nations. It became an exercise in public opinion, a smoke-screen behind which, to a 
greater or lesser extent, all the powers intervened in Spain. The Russian ambassador, Ivan 
Maisky, called the NIC the ideal Japanese wife: a woman, who sees nothing, hears nothing 
and says nothing.5 
The NIC perpetrated one of the most outrageous diplomatic farces ever seen in Europe. 
Indeed, a committee intended to supervise an arms embargo consistently turned a blind eye to 
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flagrant breaches of the agreement. This included, in 1937 alone, evidence of Italian troops 
and equipment captured after their defeat in Guadalajara (March), the destruction of the small 
Basque town of Guernica by the German Air Force (April) and the euphemistically described 
‘pirate attacks’ in the Mediterranean to refer to Italian submarines seeking to strangle the 
convoys of supplies bound for Republican ports (summer).6 
In 1937, the initial largely chaotic and disorganized Republican forces had become an 
efficient Popular Army capable of mounting well-planned offensives that again and again 
surprised the enemy: Brunete (July), Belchite (September) and Teruel (December). However, 
small gains in the battlefields, followed by bloody stalemates and painful losses, revealed that 
the sheer material superiority of the Nationalists courtesy of the NIA prevailed over the 
Republicans’ courage and even tactical planning. Indeed, the crippling but biased embargo 
tilted the balance in favour of the insurgents. While General Franco obtained on credit crucial 
oil deliveries from the main Anglo-American companies and weapons from the dictatorships, 
the Spanish government had to send its gold reserves abroad (to France and the Soviet Union) 
to finance the war effort and rely on the black market and erratic and hazardous dispatches 
from the distant Soviet Union. Eventually, as the Mediterranean route became too dangerous, 
Russian weapons had to be dispatched to French Atlantic ports and then smuggled into Spain 
across the border. This led to permanent shortages of necessary supplies and over-priced and 
often obsolete equipment. In terms of manpower, the disparity was also colossal. Some 
35,000 genuine volunteers, who had to be armed and trained, joined the International 
Brigades. Additionally, around 2,100 military personnel came from Russia. In contrast, 
nearly 80,000 Italians (Corpo di Truppe Volontarie), 19,000 Germans (Condor Legion) and 
70,000 African mercenaries fought in the Nationalists ranks. They were professional soldiers 
constantly rotated and re-equipped. 
The NIA’s blatant inefficiency was the consequence of being an instrument of British diplomacy 
whose objectives were not those portrayed by official propaganda – that is, the prevention of 
foreign participation in the war. It was created to ensure the confinement of the Spanish conflict. 
However, it also formalized the legal anomaly that a democratically elected government was on 
a par with a military coup, restrained the French from rushing to help its embattled sister Popular 
Front, eliminated a potential confrontation with the fascist powers and provided the perfect 
façade to conceal hostility towards the Republic, maintaining a semblance of impeccable 
neutrality for domestic public opinion. 
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Indeed, in the spring of 1938, it appeared to British statesmen that it was France’s reckless 
behaviour, allowing the entry of military equipment to Spain through her border, and not the 
presence of Italo-German divisions that flouted the NIA’s principles. British diplomacy 
therefore yielded a great success when, after the collapse of the French Popular Front, a new 
administration, led by Edouard Daladier, closed the border, the only safe channel of arms for 
the beleaguered Republic. Oliver Harvey, private secretary of Lord Halifax, the British 
foreign minister, wrote in his diary: ‘We seem to be drifting into the position of allowing 
Russia to champion democracy while we seek to placate the dictators. The government are 
praying for Franco’s victory’.7 
The Republic’s Fading Hopes 
In 1938, the worsening of the international situation offered the Republic some glimmer of 
hope. On 12 March 1938, Germany annexed Austria (the Anschluss) and made plans for the 
next prize, the Sudetenland (Czechoslovakia). On 25 July, the Republican Army launched an 
ambitious offensive. Its troops crossed the River Ebro, taking the Nationalists by surprise, and 
establishing a bridgehead 40 kilometres into enemy territory. The Battle of the Ebro became the 
longest and bloodiest of the entire war. However, the fate of the conflict was ultimately decided 
in the European chancelleries. 
As war seemed about to break out in Europe, Republican optimism contrasted with 
Nationalist gloom. On 27 September, after much hesitation, Franco reassured the Allies of his 
neutrality in the event of a continental conflict. However, they could not ignore the vast 
amount of Italo-German weapons and troops in Spain. Nationalist headquarters could not but 
dread that as soon as hostilities began on the continent the Republic would declare war on 
Germany and link its fortune to that of the Western democracies. The insurgents would then 
find themselves geographically isolated from their friends and starved of military supplies, if 
not at war with the Allies. In the event, the international situation could not have evolved more 
favourably for Franco. Despite the gravity of the crisis, appeasement prevailed. On 29 
September, Chamberlain and Daladier met Hitler in Munich, with Mussolini acting as mediator. 
They agreed to Hitler’s plans and the Czechs were brow-beaten into surrendering the territory 
the Germans wanted. 
On 16 November 1938, the Battle of the Ebro ended. It had taken the Nationalists almost four 
months to regain the territory lost in July. Despite their material inferiority, the Republicans had 
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not been routed but morale had plummeted. Hopes of reversing the unfairness embodied by the 
NIA had been shattered in Munich. While the Republic could not replace its massive material 
losses, the Nationalists, promptly rearmed by Germany, launched a decisive offensive into 
Catalonia which concluded in February 1939. At that stage, the government still held 30 percent 
of Spain. However, the Republic did not fight until the bitter end but imploded when some 
leading political and military figures revolted in a deluded and vain attempt to negotiate a 
conditional end to the conflict. Clashes between rival Republican forces ruined the possibility of 
further resistance. The war officially concluded on 1 April. 
Nationalist propaganda during and after the conflict succeeded in re-writing history. A military 
coup was described as a glorious crusade and its leader, General Francisco Franco, hailed as 
Caudillo Invicto (Undefeated Chieftain). In fact, based on material evidence Franco could not go 
down as a new Napoleon. It had taken him 33 months of steadfast struggle to succeed. Without 
thousands of African mercenaries, constant and massive Italo-German aid and the NIA’s farce, 
the Republic would have won the war. 
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Growing up under the last years of the dictatorship of General Francisco Franco and then 
experiencing the democratic transition in the late 1970s, I became aware of the crucial importance of 
the civil war in the course of contemporary Spanish politics. Years later, while studying for my 
undergraduate degree in Britain I also realized the huge impact of that war outside its borders. Today, 
one can find a monument to the British volunteers in Spain right next to the famous London Eye. 
Nearly 70 years on, the constant flood of publications and academic polemic surrounding the subject 
testifies to its enduring effect and popular fascination. I trust you are all encouraged to read and learn 
more about this riveting fratricidal conflict. 
 
